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CARTEL STABILITY UNDER QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION
IWAN BOS AND MARCO A. MARINI
Abstract. This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically
di¤erentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the rm with
the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the
collusive agreement. The lowest-quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when
the di¤erence in unit production costs is su¢ ciently small.
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1. Introduction
In this note, we examine cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically dif-
ferentiated. Goods or services are di¤erentiated vertically when there is consensus among
consumers about how to rank them quality-wise; comparing products A and B, all agree A
to have a higher (perceived) value than B or vice versa. There might, however, still be a
demand for lower-quality goods when buyers face budget constraints or di¤er in their will-
ingness to pay for quality. This creates an incentive for suppliers to compete through o¤ering
di¤erent price-quality combinations.
One implication of this price-quality dispersion is that rms that consider colluding typ-
ically face heterogeneous incentive constraints. The fact that rms are induced to charge
di¤erent prices, for example, a¤ects both collusive and noncooperative prots. From a
supply-side perspective, there commonly exists a positive relationship between the quality
of a good and its production costs. This, too, impacts both sides of the constraint. It is
therefore a priori unclear how quality di¤erentiation impacts the sustainability of collusion.
The scarce literature on this topic provides mixed results and, moreover, does not con-
sider the potential impact of cost heterogeneity.1 Assuming identical costs, Häckner (1994)
and Symeonidis (1999) both analyze an innitely repeated vertically di¤erentiated duopoly
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game.2 Häckner (1994) nds that it is the high-quality supplier who has the strongest incen-
tive to deviate, whereas Symeonidis (1999) establishes that the lowest-quality seller is the
one most eager to leave the cartel.
In the following, we show that this cost assumption may not be innocuous. In the context
of an n-rm innitely repeated price-setting game, we allow production costs to increase
with quality. Under the assumption that colluding rms maintain their pre-collusive market
shares, we nd that it is the competitive price-cost margin rather than the quality of the
product that drives the incentive to deviate. Specically, it is the supplier with the lowest
noncooperative price-cost margin who has the strongest incentive to chisel on the cartel.
Moreover, our analysis conrms the above-mentioned conclusion by Symeonidis (1999) when
the di¤erence in unit costs is su¢ ciently small.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 contains the main nding. Section 4
concludes.
2. Model
We consider an extended version of the classic vertical di¤erentiation models of Mussa
and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). There is a given set of suppliers,
denoted N = f1; : : : ; ng, who repeatedly interact over an innite, discrete time horizon. In
every period t 2 N, they simultaneously make price decisions with the aim to maximize
the expected discounted sum of their prot stream. Firms face a common discount factor
 2 (0; 1) and all prices set up until t  1 are assumed public knowledge.
Each rm i 2 N sells a single variant of the product with quality vi. We assume 1 >
vn > vn 1 > ::: > v1 > 0 and refer to rm n as the top rm, rm 1 as the bottom rm
and all others as intermediate rms. Unit production costs of rm i 2 N are given by the
constant ci and we suppose these costs to be positive and (weakly) increasing in quality, i.e.,
cn  cn 1  : : :  c1 > 0.
Consumers have a valuation for the various product types of , which is uniformly dis-
tributed on [; ]  R++. A higher  corresponds to a higher gross utility when consuming
variant vi. Buyers purchase no more than one item so that someone locatedat  obtains
the following utility
(2.1) U() =

vi   pi when buying from rm i
0 when not buying,
where pi 2

0; vn

is the price set by rm i.3 Using (2.1), it can be easily veried that a
consumer at i 2 [; ] is indi¤erent between buying from, say, rm i+ 1 and rm i when
(2.2) i(pi+1; pi) =
pi+1   pi
vi+1   vi ;
2Apart from being analytically convenient, the identical cost assumption can be defended on the grounds
that the di¤erence in quality may mainly come from upfront sunk investments in which case the impact on
prices would be limited.
3Note that none of the buyers would buy at prices in excess of vn.
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for every i = 1; 2; :::; n   1. In the ensuing analysis, we further assume that the market is
covered (i.e., all consumers buy a product).4
Current prot of the bottom rm (i = 1) is therefore given by
(2.3) 1 (p1; p2) = (p1   c1)  (1   ) ;
where 1 = 1(p2; p1) is as specied by (2.2). For each intermediate rm (i = 2; 3; :::; n  1)
prot is
(2.4) i (pi 1; pi; pi+1) = (pi   ci)  (i   i 1) ;
and for the top rm (i = n) it is
(2.5) n (pn 1; pn) = (pn   cn) 
 
   n 1

:
Before analyzing the innitely repeated version of the above game, let us rst consider
the one-shot case in more detail. In this setting, each rm simultaneously picks a price to
maximize its prot as specied in (2.3)-(2.5). Following the rst-order conditions, this yields
three types of best-response functions:
(2.6) bp1(p2) = 1
2
(p2 + c1   (v2   v1))
for the bottom rm (i = 1). For each intermediate rm (i = 2; 3; :::; n  1), the best-reply is
given by
(2.7) bpi(pi 1; pi+1) = 1
2
pi 1(vi+1   vi) + pi+1(vi   vi 1)
(vi+1   vi 1) +
1
2
ci:
The best-response function of the top rm (i = n) is
(2.8) bpn(pn 1) = 1
2
 
pn 1 + cn + (vn   vn 1)

:
Since the action sets are compact and convex and the above best-reply functions are con-
tractions, there exists a unique static Nash equilibrium price vector p for any nite number
of rms.5 Finally, we impose two more conditions to ensure that the equilibrium solution is
interior (i.e., all rms have a positive output at p) and that the market is indeed covered
at the single-shot Nash equilibrium:
(2.9)  > n 1 > 

n 2 > : : : > 

i > ::: > 

1 >  >
p1
v1
> 0;
where i  i
 
pi+1; p

i

and pi  ci, for all i 2 N .
4This is a common assumption in contributions that employ this type of spatial setting. See, for example,
Tirole (1988, pp. 296-298) and Ecchia and Lambertini (1997).
5See, for instance, Friedman (1991, p.84). A su¢ cient condition for the contraction property to hold is
(see, for example, Vives 2000, p.47):
@2i
@ (pi)
2 +
P
j 6=i
 @2i@pi@pj
 < 0;
which, using (2.4) for all intermediate rms i = 2; :::; n  1, becomes
vi 1   vi+1
(vi+1   vi) (vi   vi 1) < 0;
which holds. The same applies for the top and the bottom rm.
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3. Sustainability of Collusion
Within the above framework, we now study the sustainability of collusion assuming a
standard grim-trigger punishment strategy. The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of
a rm i 2 N is then given by:
(3.1) 
i  ci   (1  )  di     i  0;
where ci = i
 
pci 1; p
c
i ; p
c
i+1

is a rms collusive payo¤, di = i
 
pci 1; p
d
i ; p
c
i+1

, with pdi =bpi(pci 1; pci+1), is deviation payo¤ and i = i  pi 1; pi ; pi+1 is the Nash equilibrium payo¤.
Consequently, a collusive contract comprising the entire industry is sustainable only when

i  0, for all i 2 N .
In principle, this set-up allows for a plethora of sustainable collusive contracts. In the fol-
lowing, we limit ourselves to what is perhaps the simplest possible agreement. Specically,
we consider the maximization of total cartel prots without side payments under the as-
sumption that rms maintain their market shares at pre-collusive levels. Such an agreement
is appealing for several reasons. First, it seems a natural focal point in the issue of how to
divide the market. Second, there have been quite a few cartels that employed such (or simi-
lar) market-sharing scheme.6 Third, as will become clear in the following, it is arguably the
most subtle arrangement in that rm behavior maintains a competitive appearance, thereby
minimizing the possibility of cartel detection.
Let us rst consider the case where none of the ICCs is binding (for which  ! 1 is
su¢ cient). As an initial observation, notice that the xed market share assumption implies
that the price ranking should remain unaltered (i.e., collusive prices are strictly increasing
in quality). Next, note that the collusive price vector must contain a price for the lowest
quality product that satises:
v1   p1 = 0:
As prices are strategic complements, setting p1 < v1 would be suboptimal, whereas setting
p1 > v1 is excluded by the covered market assumption.7 Hence,
pc1 = v1:
The consumer who was indi¤erent between rm 1 and 2 absent collusion has now the
following utility when buying from rm 1:
U(1) =

p2   p1
v2   v1

v1   pc1:
Given xed market shares, this then gives the highest possible collusive price for the product
of rm 2.
U(1) =

p2   p1
v2   v1

v1   pc1 =

p2   p1
v2   v1

v2   pc2:
Rearranging gives,
pc2 = p

2 + (p
c
1   p1) :
6See, for example, Harrington (2006).
7Albeit computationally more cumbersome, one in principle could relax the xed market size assumption.
This, however, would not alter the qualitative nature of our results.
CARTEL STABILITY UNDER QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION 5
A higher collusive price by rm 2 would mean that the customer on the boundary prefers rm
1, which contradicts market shares being xed. Likewise, a lower price implies a decrease in
sales for rm 1 and, therefore, cannot occur either. The unconstrained collusive prices for
all other rms can be determined in a similar fashion. In general, the collusive price of rm
i 2 Nnf1g is equal to the Nash price plus the price increase by the lowest-quality rm:
(3.2) pci = p

i + (p
c
1   p1) :
Let us now consider the possibility that rms are less patient such that one or more ICCs
may be binding. The next result shows that it is the supplier with the lowest price-cost
margin absent collusion who has the tightest incentive constraint.
Proposition 1. For any i; j 2 N and j 6= i, if pi   ci > pj   cj, then 
i > 
j.
Proof. To begin, consider the ICC of an intermediate rm i:

i  ci   (1  )  di     i  0;
which, for some collusive price pci and xing market shares at pre-collusive Nash levels,
can be written as:

i  pci   ci   (1  ) 
 
pdi   ci
   di   di 1 
i   i 1
     (pi   ci)  0;
where di  i
 
pci+1; p
d
i

and di 1  i
 
pdi ; p
c
i 1

. Using pci = p

i + p
c
1   p1 and rearranging,
this simplies to:

i  pc1   p1 + (1  ) 
 
pi   ci  
 
pdi   ci
   di   di 1 
i   i 1
 !  0:
Hence, as the rst few terms are identical across rms, a di¤erence is exclusively driven
by the following part:
(3.3) pi   ci  
 
pdi   ci
   di   di 1 
i   i 1
 :
Notice that
i   i 1 =
(vi   vi 1) pi+1 + (vi+1   vi) pi 1   (vi+1   vi 1) ci
2 (vi+1   vi)  (vi   vi 1) ;
and (using (3.2))
pdi =
(vi   vi 1) 
 
pi+1 + p
c
1   p1

+ (vi+1   vi) 
 
pi 1 + p
c
1   p1

+ (vi+1   vi 1)  ci
2 (vi+1   vi 1) :
In turn, this gives
di   di 1 =
(vi   vi 1) 
 
pi+1 + p
c
1   p1

+ (vi+1   vi) 
 
pi 1 + p
c
1   p1
  (vi+1   vi 1)  ci
2 (vi+1   vi)  (vi   vi 1) :
Next, substituting in (3.3) yields:
pi   ci  
 
(vi   vi 1) 
 
pc1 + p

i+1   p1

+ (vi+1   vi) 
 
pc1 + p

i 1   p1
  (vi+1   vi 1)  ci2
4 (vi+1   vi 1)2  [pi   ci]
;
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which, after some manipulations, can be shown to equal
(pi   ci)2  
 
1
2
(pc1   p1) + pi   ci
2
pi   ci
:
Thus, at any given collusive price pc1, the only potential di¤erence lies in the noncooperative
price-cost margin: pi   ci. Let x = pi   ci and y = 12 (pc1   p1) and evaluate:
x2   (y + x)2
x
=
 y2
x
  2y:
Taking the rst derivative with respect to x givesy
x
2
> 0:
We conclude that among intermediate rms the ICC is monotonic in the price-cost margin
and that the rm with the lowest price-cost margin has the tightest ICC.
Next, consider rm n and rm n  1 for which the rst part of the derivation is the same
as before. It therefore su¢ ces to evaluate the following inequality:
(pn   cn)2  
 
1
2
(pc1   p1) + pn   cn
2
pn   cn
>
 
pn 1   cn 1
2    1
2
(pc1   p1) + pn 1   cn 1
2
pn 1   cn 1
:
Let x = pn   cn, y = 12 (pc1   p1) and z = pn 1   cn 1. Thus,
x2   (y + x)2
x
>
z2   (y + z)2
z
:
Rearranging gives:
x > z () pn   cn > pn 1   cn 1.
Hence, it is the supplier with the smaller noncooperative price-cost margin (rm n or rm
n   1) who has the tighter incentive constraint. In a similar fashion, it can be shown that
p2   c2 > p1   c1 implies 
2 > 
1 and that p1   c1 > p2   c2 implies 
1 > 
2. We therefore
conclude that if pi   ci > pj   cj, then 
i > 
j, for all i; j 2 N and j 6= i. 
A low competitive price-cost margin implies a relatively severe punishment in the event
of a cartel break-down. This provides an incentive to abide by the agreement. What works
against this force is that, with xed market shares, these rms collusive gains are also
smaller. The previous proposition reveals that the latter e¤ect strictly dominates the former.
The next result follows immediately. In stating this result, let 4cij = ci   cj for any rm
i; j 2 N and j 6= i.
Corollary 1. For any rm i; j 2 N and j 6= i, 9 2 R++ such that if 4cij <  and vi > vj,
then 
i > 
j.
Hence, if the di¤erence in unit production costs is su¢ ciently small, then it is the lowest-
quality supplier who has the tightest incentive constraint. Our analysis thus conrms the
above-mentioned conclusion by Symeonidis (1999) in case quality heterogeneity is primarily
driven by (sunk) xed costs rather than variable costs.
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4. Conclusion
Many markets are characterized by some degree of quality di¤erentiation with correspond-
ing rm heterogeneity in cost and demand. One implication of such di¤erences is that collud-
ing rms typically face non-identical incentive constraints. Existing literature on this topic
focuses on demand di¤erences, while ignoring the potential impact of cost heterogeneity. In
this note, we considered how cartel stability is a¤ected when unit costs are increasing in prod-
uct quality. Under the assumption that colluding rms maintain their pre-collusive market
shares, we found that the incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement is monotonic in
the noncooperative price-cost margin. Specically, the supplier with the lowest competitive
mark-up is ceteris paribus most inclined to leave the cartel. Moreover, it is the lowest-quality
seller who has the tightest incentive constraint when di¤erences in unit costs are su¢ ciently
small.
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